

The Competence of Political Science: “Progress in Political Research” Revisited Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1999

MATTHEW HOLDEN, JR. *University of Virginia*

Political science is two realms, the intellectual and the organizational, and the task is to consider how the organizational realm might be adapted to the highest improvement of the intellectual realm. Political science has a certain competence (domain) in the study of politics as the organization of power. It also seeks to expand competence as capability. Charles Merriam provides a point of departure. Merriam’s most successful idea has been that of enhancing competence through improvements in “the field of method.” Competence, however, now demands methodological flexibility, so as to probe more into the exercise of power. Four fields are strategic: public administration, political interests, urbanization, and the interpenetration of politics and economics. Competence also leads into unorthodox subjects, such as force and foolish, irrational, and pathological decision making (or “the Oxenstierna-Mullins Effect”). Finally, competence demands (and is enhanced by) the reach of political science into serious practical problems of human affairs.

In framing this address I thought about my longtime friend, Aaron Wildavsky, who was, as Paul Sniderman said recently,¹ consciously or otherwise an advocate for political science. Once, he disagreed with something I said, and his query came back: “But what shall we teach the young?” He understood the folly of recruiting and helping to educate human beings and at the same time pummeling them into conscious disdain for what they do. In that sense, I take on an advocate’s role self-consciously. The young scholar learns to think about where the discipline is going, and this is important. But it is so much more important to think where the discipline ought to go and to rise above pettiness in so doing. This is about the calling, or about the purpose to be served by political science and by one’s work in political science.

The calling—obligation or even duty, to use a very old-fashioned word—is to enhance the competence of political science in the interest of human understanding. This depends, among other things, on ideas to guide research and on strategic conceptions about what research is worth the efforts of grown men and women. In political inquiry, human beings still see, as St. Paul said, through a glass darkly. The task that justifies the allocation of social resources to support a political science is the task of seeking knowledge that would make it possible to see through the glass a little more clearly. Thomas Hobbes ([1651] 1991) starts with two crucial issues: how to create political order and civilized life and how to discover the ways of doing so. Hobbes lived in a world of extraordinary turbulence and saw the vast ignorance with which people sought to meet that turbulence. It led him to theoretical extremes which give him the bad reputation that makes him unwelcome today. “The skill of making and maintaining commonwealths . . . consisteth,” he wrote, “in cer-

tain rules . . . which neither poor men have had the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity or the method to find out” (p. 145).

The search for the rules of politics, which will explain what is involved in the making and maintaining of commonwealths, is the calling. The world of political science is two realms, intellectual and organizational. The intellectual realm is contained in the theories, hypotheses, doctrines, facts, and so forth, that are embodied in our study and our teaching about the parameters of politics (culture, economics, climate, demography, etc.), outer limits of which are set in the extreme case by human heredity and nonhuman environment; the institutions and actual processes of action in politics (adjudication, legislation, administration, elections, coalition formation, factions, committees, wars, agitation, resistance, persuasion, etc.); and the product of politics (policies, programs as decisions subordinate to policies, operational decisions as subordinate to programs, etc.).

Political science is also an organizational realm of departments, schools, journals, editors, applications, review committees, and so on. This organizational realm is a human network with something akin to its own largely unwritten “constitution.” It has a set of more or less definitive understandings as to who is a member (full, partial, or potential), who is an acceptable outsider, with some legitimate presence, and who is entirely excluded. These understandings extend to posts of honor, eligibility for them, and accession to them. They extend to decision process rules, rules as to substantive outputs (which are mandatory, which permissible, and which impermissible), and some understandings as to rules for changing the rules.

These two realms shape each other, although I think the intellectual realm is largely the expression of what people in the organizational realm do. In the organizational realm, however, the purpose of what we teach is to enable young scholars to enter, and entering, to make a contribution in the intellectual realm. Career is

Matthew Holden, Jr., is Henry L. and Grace M. Doherty Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22901.

¹ Private conversation, August 1999.

mere necessity, but calling is far more important than career.

THREE LEVELS OF KNOWLEDGE

The young scholar needs to learn to understand at three levels. First, he or she must acquire what is taught expressly. That is the first level. Second, the young scholar should come to understand what lies beneath what he or she is being taught. What were the assumptions, facts, methods, and subtleties that shaped what the teacher understood clearly, but lacked time, incentive, or sometimes means expressly to communicate? Third, he or she must understand what lies beneath the beneath. What was the intellectual history and atmosphere that affected the teachers' teachers? Deep grounding in the literature is a necessity.

On such a premise, I revisit the presidential address of Charles E. Merriam (1926), entitled "Progress in Political Research." I will not go very far into the overall career of Merriam, although the temptation is great. His relationships to his students, Chicago politics and politicians, the national government under Hoover and Roosevelt, foundations, the political science and social science communities, and the University of Chicago's president, Robert Maynard Hutchins, all are worth the kind of treatment that Robert Skidelsky (1994) gave to John Maynard Keynes (see also Karl 1974).

My choice is to describe Merriam's presidential address, what political scientists have taken from it, what elements remain to be developed, and what are its implications at the end of one century and the beginning of another. When I was a graduate student, behavioralism was on its upswing. In that time of intense exchange between "behavioralists" and "traditionalists," Merriam was the scholar who seemed to have anticipated it all, but with a firm grasp of hard political realities. His expressed approach, more than that of any other scholar, provided the scope that I found helpful in going beneath the beneath. "We do not," he said, "teach all that we know, and are driven sometimes to teach what we are not so sure of." The moral is: "Take a chance intellectually, because you do not have to know that what you are proposing is true before you begin to investigate it." He also said that the existing conventional categories are by no means the only ones for studying important matters relating to power. We might, he said, "have studies of the use of force in political situations, and its opposites, passive resistance and noncooperation; . . . the nature of political interests; . . . use of magic, superstition, and ceremonialism in politics; . . . propaganda; . . . the actual process used in conference, so significant a function in modern affairs; . . . the maintenance of political morale; . . . leadership, obedience, cooperation; . . . the causes of war as well as its diplomatic history and law" (Merriam 1926, 6). Merriam in 1925 thus issued what was a veritable charter for the more adventurous program that has characterized behavioral political science at its most expansive.

I adapt the Merriam themes by including in my title

"the competence of political science." Competence means the capacity to do something. It means what one possesses, as in a Victorian novel a young person with some trust income is described as having "a competence." It also means the domain in which one has the right to act, as in the term a "competent" court.² To claim competence is not to say there is no need for self-improvement. Of course there is a need for self-improvement.

In the culture of political science there is sometimes a certain anxiety. Young scholars learn to justify arguments with the phrase "political science has neglected." The phrase implies intellectual or moral negligence, as if people knew what they should have done but did not do it. But this bespeaks an emotional not an intellectual state. It is an inheritance from years ago, certainly after World War II. Political scientists learned a certain inverted Pharisaism: "God knows, I am not as good as other scientists are." It would surprise me not the least if similar views were entertained by many deans, provosts, and presidents across the country. The term "self-hatred" has come, from psychoanalysis, into discussions of group behavior. It is used to describe a member of a group who treats the group with disesteem and seeks acceptance into some other group of higher standing. Under such a condition, it would also not be surprising if some members of the discipline would wish to assimilate to disciplines of higher status (to be taken by economists for economists) and look down at other colleagues who do not have the same wish or capacity. (Sometimes we compensate by seeking others we can snub, although in the end that is counterproductive.³) It is hardly surprising that there is a need for a good infusion of self-respect and self-confidence, and along with self-confidence a degree of intellectual respect that allows differences to be examined with some precision and clarity.

IN BEHALF OF OURSELVES: WE KNOW MORE ABOUT POLITICS THAN DO OTHER SCHOLARS

Of course, our discipline is greatly imperfect. What discipline, profession, or human activity is not? Law? Medicine? Theology? Psychiatry? Economics? True, some other disciplines are logically more coherent. They have a dominant set of assumptions, theories, methods, and data, although none of the social sciences approach the coherence of physics, chemistry, or biology. Some are equipped with better mathematicians. Someday we may get closer to the standards in those fields. *But, as far as we are, we know more politics than*

² See Garner 1999: "competence, n . . . 2. The capacity of an official body to do something, 'the court's competence to enter a valid judgment.'"

³ One of my graduate school contemporaries, a famous political scientist I will not name, said that at a certain stage of his life, he and his friends used to stand near the education faculty as they marched into commencement and conspicuously call them "mister." If this is still our attitude, it can only obstruct our need to infuse what we know from political science into primary and secondary education.

any other discipline. It is our business to know politics, however imprecisely we state it.

There is, I contend, one common thread in politics: the organization of power. The concepts, techniques, or data of international politics, comparative politics, American politics, and so forth, are translatable each into the language of the other. Power is the key to political practice and, accordingly, to the study of that practice. The competence (domain) of political science is the study of the parameters, processes, and products of power. Its competence (intellectual capability) also extends to wherever human beings organize power, whether it is called officially "public" or "private." This is the point of view that I attribute to Charles Merriam, and I now turn to an excursus on method and then to some big issues within conventional fields where there are significant opportunities.

MERRIAM'S FORMULATION OF PROGRESS AND THE TRIUMPH OF METHOD

When Merriam (1926) chose as his subject "Progress in Political Research," the American Political Science Association was twenty-one years old. Merriam concluded that "these twenty-one years have been a period of substantial progress and solid achievement, more than justifying the expectations of those who aided in launching the Association" (p. 4). In 1999, we should recall that the original objectives were by no means theoretical only. At first, there was a proposal to create the American Society of Comparative Legislation (Dodd 1904, 6). The originators soon concluded that it would be better to have a broader society "to embrace the whole field of Political Science, and thus embrace Comparative Legislation as one of its topics" (p. 6). Comparative legislation was a practical subject, "including the operation of statutes, uniform legislation, and the promotion of publications, especially indexes and digests of record material" (p. 11).

Merriam offered a summary of where he thought there had been progress and stated an agenda. The research agenda includes both what we now regard as conventional and what he expressly described as "unorthodox." He also discussed opportunities for extending political science beyond the existing academic universe. I shall discuss these in turn to show how they are pertinent to the competence of political science at the end of this century.

More specifically, Merriam saw progress in certain fields of political science and in "the field of method." He mentions the following areas: parties (Merriam 1926, 2–3), political theory (p. 10), international relations and international law, constitutional law, public administration (including administrative law and organization), legislation, and problems of the modern city (p. 1). Indeed, he said, "it would be interesting to examine the fact-content of these various inquiries and to develop the various principles and conclusions that have been established, but the limits of this discussion will not permit such an appraisal" (p. 3).

These are now conventional (standard) fields of research and teaching. The major additions since Mer-

riam's time are comparative politics and methods. The physical and intellectual growth of the discipline has occurred primarily through specialization within all these general fields. There is still considerable scope for intellectual progress. So much has happened in 74 years, and so much remains. I return to this below.

It is in "the field of method" that the most change has occurred.⁴ The political scientist of 1925 would simply be lost in 1999 material. By the same token, new scholars in 1999 are being educated in a way that leaves them with no connection to why they are doing what they are doing, or what the changes since 1925 were intended to achieve.

"In the field of method some stirrings may be observed," Merriam (1926, 2) stated, and he was often the stirrer, as his audience would have known. "On the whole, the most striking tendency of method during this period has been that toward actual observations of political processes and toward closer analysis of their meaning—this in contrast to a more strictly historical, structural, and legalistic method of approach to the problems of politics" (p. 3).

Merriam evinced in his address an unqualified commitment to "the field of method." He advocated turning concepts and data into terms subject to mathematical measurement, and the acquisition of the data was an important element. Merriam participated in these innovations to a limited degree, particularly with the help of Harold F. Gosnell and Harold D. Lasswell (Simon 1996). He was less the doer than the inspirer, sponsor, and academic entrepreneur. Merriam put a view into the following sentence. "The quantitative study of economic and other social phenomena holds large possibilities of fruitful inquiry, providing of course that the numbers and measurements are related to significant hypotheses or patterns" (p. 7).

As the inspirer, Merriam played a significant role. Quantitative analysis of politics had not been established as a strong central concept, although it was not an unknown idea. Francis Lieber ([1853] 1877), the German-born political scientist, said in 1853 that he had long been interested in election statistics from many countries (see Freidel 1947, 292–5; Haddow 1939, 138–44; Lieber 1993, 21–32; Merriam [1903] 1969; Nevins and Thomas 1952). Some historians working on politics in the 1890s had begun this kind of work. A. Lawrence Lowell, closer in time to Merriam, was on the quantitative trail. In his 1910 presidential address, Lowell anticipated Merriam: "The more complex the phenomena to be studied, the greater the care that must be used in accepting the conclusions given by statistics, and yet in political science they are invaluable."

⁴ I have consulted (1) some widely known scholars who are good judges of quantitative methods; (2) *Political Analysis*, the specialized journal of political methodologists; and (3) cursorily, the last two years of the *APSR*, the *American Journal of Politics*, the *Journal of Politics*, and the *Political Science Quarterly*. In this part of the preparation, in particular, I had the excellent help of Amy Kristen Stewart. I have also had the benefit of discussion over the past several years with Paul Freedman and Marc Hetherington, whose explanations have been helpful. In this subject matter, above all, the errors are mine, and no one should blame Freedman, Hetherington, or Stewart for any of it.

able" (pp. 10–1). According to Rogers (1968, xxxi), "if there was not mathematics [in Lowell's writing], at least he used numerals."

Fifteen years after Lowell's presidency came Charles Merriam. At that time, the requirements were still more or less literary: command of the English language, sufficient ability to read German or French, and passage of the field course in political philosophy or history of political theory. As to the dissertation, it was not unusual for a student to choose a topic, or be given one, and write the project with little or no further consultation with the faculty.⁵ Merriam proposed a major change in both procedure and substance. Those who studied political science at Chicago testify that Merriam was different, including Herbert Simon (1996, 57, 63), C. Herman Pritchett, Gabriel Almond, and Robert E. Martin.⁶

On the whole, political science had accepted this emphasis by the early 1930s. The most obvious form was modern polling techniques, which made it possible to go behind the mere paper record and ask the voters directly what they did and why. This is the hallmark of the work of Angus Campbell and others at the Survey Research Center in Ann Arbor. This procedure became the norm, the expected standard.

Quantification and/or mathematical analysis now appears in virtually every field—international relations, comparative politics, state and local politics, judicial behavior—with the possible exception of political theory. Some major journals are virtually closed to anything else, and most carry a great deal. Very few are predominantly narrative. The same pressure is present, although not to the same degree, in the most prestigious university presses.

Dimensional analysis, model specification, refined distinctions among different types of designs, quasi-

experiments and challenges to the very idea of them, operationalization or measurement of variables and concepts, time-series analysis, panel and cohort analysis, maximum likelihood estimation, Monte Carlo simulation, and bootstrapping are standard matters for the education of new scholars.

Almost twenty years ago Nathaniel Beck (1983, 557) reported the maturation of the statistical study of time series: "While this is not the place to discuss the theoretical merits of these studies, one must be impressed by the growing methodological sophistication of the discipline's graduate students who are now expected to add ARIMA (autoregressive integrated moving average) and GLS (generalized least squares) to their list of acronyms." The list of acronyms grows, as does the need to know how to perform the operations. Young scholars who do not develop this capacity to some minimal degree will be at a disadvantage. Senior scholars who never developed this capacity or have allowed it to wither have to refresh it. Otherwise, they will be like the residents of a country who cannot speak the language of a flood of new migrants.

Indeed, many of us are learning to speak the migrants' language, however ungrammatically. But what of the migrants' ideas? Has the rapid saturation of quantification/mathematical analysis been unrelievedly beneficial for progress in scientific content in politics? When one probes deeply into content, the answer is "no" or "not yet," although this answer requires some nuance. Advanced quantitative/mathematical political science has been striking in regard to electoral studies, and in a lesser degree to legislation—a point to which I return momentarily. Yet, overall, substantive improvement in the whole body of political science is not commensurate with the rate of change in quantification and mathematics. The substantive part of the Merriam program has been fulfilled to a far more limited extent, and in some respects it is virtually untested. The word "method" meant more to him than quantification merely, and in this respect Merriam has been stymied, if not entirely defeated.

If we say Merriam's substantive agenda is not worth studying, that is one answer. If we say that it is worth studying, and that others are doing it well enough already, that is another answer. Either could be advocated or opposed. But to do so explicitly is to proceed in accord with the idea that young scholars should be encouraged to think much more about calling. *There is a need for far greater intensity about deciding what is worthy studying and why, actually studying it, reporting it, and distilling its essence into the aggregate body of knowledge.*

The competence of political science is, in some respects, vastly enhanced by the triumph of the field of method, but not without costs. With respect, I suggest that the decision rules within our organizational realm—as practiced in the aggregate by deans, department chairs, promotion and tenure committees, conference program committees (to a lesser extent), journal editors, and grant review panels—have a tendency to suppress discovery. But discovery is the name of the game. Herbert Simon (1996), who made thinking one

⁵ This is shown in the way Emmette S. Redford wrote his dissertation at Harvard. He had great enthusiasm and respect for Charles H. McIlwain at Harvard but decided not to work on political philosophy because he was not good at foreign languages. "McIlwain did not think one should major in political philosophy unless he knew French, German, Latin, and probably Greek." Ultimately, Redford wrote under Arthur Holcombe, who gave him a topic (constitutional problems of American economic planning). He wrote the dissertation without discussing it with anyone, as far as he remembered in later years (Redford interview by William S. Livingstone [Baer, Jewell, and Sigelman 1991, 57]). The way Redford worked at Harvard probably was about the same over the rest of the United States into the 1960s. (It was the way I worked with Norton Long at Northwestern.)

⁶ Pritchett said: "We were propelled into an acceptance of the fact that political science was a social science and was obligated to use the methods of the other social sciences" (Pritchett interview by Gordon Baker [Baer, Jewell, and Sigelman 1991, 109]). Gabriel Almond stated: "While I suffered a bit at the beginning of my career because a Ph.D. in political science from Chicago was a little unconventional, I got an enormous advantage out of it in the period after World War II, when I discovered that I was about a decade ahead in terms of my training as compared with colleagues in my age group" (Almond interview by Richard A. Brody [Baer, Jewell, and Sigelman 1991, 123]). Robert E. Martin commented in the same mode, referring to himself: (I was) "the first black political scientist to do a doctoral dissertation in political science with heavy reliance on quantitative methodology—my study of the AAA referenda, which produced hundreds of statistical tables and numerous graphs" (Martin interview by Russell Adams [Baer, Jewell, and Sigelman 1991, 162]).

of his many specialties, is uncertain exactly how he thinks. He is satisfied if he can form problems through loose unrigorous symbols in the mind, subject to proof later. If that is so for Simon, surely it is so for the rest of us. At least it is for me. Some costs are too high, and some adjustments are intellectually feasible.

THE OLD LITERATURE AND HISTORY STILL COUNT

The corpus of political science is, and will long continue to be, a source from which important understanding can be distilled. In this I include political theory of the grand tradition (Holden 1996, 16–20), which is not a subject I studied well. In pondering some problems of public administration, I wondered which of the earlier writers would have been concerned with such matters. By no analytical process that I can identify, Hobbes came to mind, which in a millisecond I justified on the basis that Hobbes would have to be concerned with executive power. He was. Thus, when I went to consult Hobbes ([1651] 1991, chap. 23) I found a concept of “staff” and “line” quite as serviceable as that in contemporary public administration. It is useful to know that the concept had a good formulation three hundred years before it came into American writing.

This to me was evidence not of the backwardness of American scholarship but of the underlying permanence (or at least recurrence) of the phenomenon. For instance, I find great intellectual power in the dictum that “the making and maintaining of commonwealths” depends on skills that have to be studied, not merely on practice. For look what a mess practice has produced (Hobbes [1651] 1991, chap. 20). Deutsch’s (1953; Deutsch et al. 1957) movement, in an early quantitative format, from nationalism and social communication to the historical problem of integrating the European political communities is very close to this idea, and both are helpful. That does not mean my preference is limited to political theory of the grand tradition. There is also the vast store of empirical literature—based on experiential observation or reporting and not primarily normative—that has accrued over the course of political science’s existence.⁷

The potentialities of a political science of history also warrant our attention (Holden 1999). That merely means the application of analytical questions or principles of political science to data, extracted from such records as we obtain or re-create, about the actions and behavior of people long since dead. It is highly probable that many of the things we believe about the United States (or any other country, perhaps) will be altered significantly by close study of data from the past.

Beyond this, I propose a deliberate decision to encourage “soft” research. Merriam (1926, 2) referred

approvingly to an improvement in methods: “The most striking tendency of method during this period has been that toward actual observations of political processes and toward closer analysis of their meaning.” What are the ways of actual observation? One of the ways of “actual observation,” is participant observation (Holden 1996). It remains the best single method of hearing and seeing directly what politicians do as they are doing it. The work produced by its most consistent and explicit advocate, Richard Fenno, receives nothing but well-merited praise (Fiorina 1996, 90). Yet, the methodologists hardly take note of his writing on the method that he himself employs (Fenno 1990).

The triumph of method to which I refer has carried us away from the aspiration toward actual observations. Reinvigorating such qualitative research is desirable because, at minimum, it is a precursor to quantitative work that may yet be years away.⁸ Participant-observation has been the subject of one article in the leading annual on methods.⁹ I am aware of no other, although in some disciplines it has been reconceived as ethnographic research (Schwartzman 1993). Merriam found that the most striking tendency in methods was the use of “actual observation of political processes and closer analysis for their meaning,” but the tendency has been sharply reduced. This works against the competence (knowledge and capability) of political science.

Leaving aside the observation method for a moment, I turn to the importance of thinking. Simon (1996, 106–7) says that he used mathematics as a means of thought, and this mathematics “is relatively unrigorous, loose, heuristic,” and “solutions had to be checked for correctness.” He found unexpectedly that Tjalling Koopmans did not agree at all. Koopmans deemed mathematics a language of proof “to guarantee that conclusions were correct, that they could be derived rigorously” (pp. 106–7). Simon could never persuade Koopmans that “the logic of discovery is quite different from the logic of verification.” Their friendship continued until Koopmans’s death. Perhaps had Koopmans lived longer, Simon said they might have reconciled their different views about mathematics. “It is his view, of course, that prevails in economics today, and to my mind it is a great pity for economics and the world that it does” (Simon 1996, 107).

Anything should do if it helps one formulate the problem. It is impressive that Simon had such a view. But there is no reason the same principle is not legitimate even if the problem is formed with words or even with literal pictures in the mind. There are times when the significant intellectual problems flow directly out of the solution of an instant problem. But that is not the only way. Scientific progress demands methodological flexibility.

On this point, let me recite a fish story—from ichthyology, not the liars’ bench. The salmon is born,

⁷ Due to changes in style and language, it is necessary to note that “empirical” refers to experience and can be based as well upon the naturalists’ method of observation as upon structured experiment. Simon (1996, 57) makes the point that his *Administrative Behavior* was empirical in that sense (p. 59 n.). His “Observation of a Business Decision” (Cyert, Simon, and Trow 1956), which in my opinion contains the seeds of “bounded rationality,” is similarly based.

⁸ On this I have had some encouraging comment by a young colleague (and e-mail correspondent), Patrick Wolf.

⁹ The first issue of *Political Methodology* contained an article on participant-observation by Jennie-Keith Ross and Marc Howard Ross (1974). I believe this first article may have been the last on the subject.

ranges very far from the natal stream, returns, spawns progeny, and dies (Hasler and Scholz 1983, 12). How? The movement of the salmon from birth to death has been a subject of speculation and study for a long time. Between the 1940s and the 1970s, Arthur Hasler and his students worked out the solution. Did he get the answer from literature or experiments? No. On vacation, climbing in the mountains, he encountered "a cool breeze bearing the fragrance of mosses and columbine." The odor so impressed him "that it evoked a flood of memories of boyhood chums and deeds long since vanished from conscious memory" (p. 12). The very next sentence states: "The association was so strong that I immediately applied it to the problem of salmon homing" (p. 12).

He had the answer, but he had to find the solution, the reason for believing the answer definitively. The successive steps took several years: an hypothesis that each stream contains a particular bouquet of fragrances to which salmon become imprinted before emigrating to the ocean; salmon subsequently use this odor as a cue to identify their natal tributary upon their return from the sea; the soil and vegetation of each drainage basin impart a distinct odor to the water, providing the unique cue for homing; and formalizing the hypothesis in collaboration with one of his students, Warren Wisby, in 1951 (Hasler and Scholz 1983, 12).

Imagine a political scientist saying to a tough critic: "I got this great idea!" "Yeah, how did you get that?" "I smelled a mountain breeze and it reminded me of my childhood." This excursus on "method" is to make one observation stand in bold relief. The triumph of "the field of method," as Merriam called it, has the effect of suppressing much inquiry that cannot be conducted in the forms of the most advanced quantification/mathematics. From the point of a *science* of politics this is counterproductive. The competence of political science is diminished if emergent political scientists increasingly are obstructed from working in simple ways—if they wish to attain the highest levels of respect—when the more advanced ways will never reach the purpose. The competence of political science is enhanced if young scholars are given greater latitude in the ways of "soft" research, from traditional theory and history to sheer thinking, all in the purpose of a stronger substantive purpose.

The strongest concentration of combining advanced methodology and substance probably is around political parties, elections, and public opinion. My guess, and it is a guess, is that the next area of concentration is "legislation," which in contemporary political science can refer to committee politics, floor politics, and congressional voting (if not otherwise characterized as floor politics). In a sense, this area analyzes politics as the production and use of information (Ferejohn and Kuklinski 1990), with some attention to money (although not much explicitly). It is about democracy as a going concern, in which most people participate at a fairly low level of intensity. There are very well-regarded studies of this type, such as the widely cited work by Lupia and McCubbins (1998).

Elections are very important to the arrangement of

power, at least in some societies and countries. But the election is not itself mainly an exercise of power. There are exercises of power in strategic and tactical decisions that will structure who gets to run for office. But in free countries these are chiefly nonelectoral and preelectoral decisions. Elections themselves are not exercises of power, except that they give the command to someone to "get out of office." Nor are they usually conceived as such by the voters. They are, as exercises of power, spasmodic at best. When the command to "get out of office" is ignored or resisted, it can be enforced only by various nonelectoral pressures (such as when powerful groups indicate that they will not cooperate with the resisters) or, ultimately, when "the popular will" is manifest by boycotts, protests, or more strenuous action.¹⁰ If I reason correctly, then the part of political science where quantitative/mathematical advance is most to be celebrated often leaves our understanding of the exercise of power relatively unaffected. It also leaves *relatively* unaffected the most disruptive factors in the parameters of politics, and quite often the products of politics (policy).

BIG ISSUES IN "CONVENTIONAL" FIELDS

What should follow if most of the substantive part of the Merriam program were taken into serious account in planning a research agenda on a large scale? The choices would concentrate on inquiries into the organization and exercise of power. In the near to middle term (five to ten years) there should be an intense concentration on both establishing the "fact-content" as well as developing the "principles and conclusions," which would mean a full review of all the areas mentioned and their logical and strategic interrelations. The ultimate objective would be, as the economist Alfred Marshall ([1890] 1997, xi) said of his own book, "an attempt to present a modern version of old doctrines with the aid of the new work, and with reference to the new problems of our own age." Ultimately, that means a coherent summation of the findings of empirical research and their integration across the fields of the discipline. This is notably important, as the fields themselves (American, Comparative, etc.) are more conventional social organizations—organizational subrealms, so to speak—than they are intellectually coherent units.¹¹

My point of departure is a concern for power. Four

¹⁰ This kind of action was reported in the media regarding Indonesia in October 1999. In due course, some scholar presumably will discuss whether this is a correct interpretation of that situation.

¹¹ It also means a clear conception, clearly argued, as to what part of our present empirical and conceptual core should now be abandoned because it is not grounded in the product of the most advanced quantitative/mathematical inquiry. Conversely, it entails the clearest attention to the theoretical significance of the adaptations that have occurred, including a clear summation as to whether they are producing empirically correct results that are more than a numeralized form of contemporary institutional history. I am contemplating a matrix with the major methodological innovations and techniques on one axis and substantive fields of work on the other. This may be impractical, although I do not see why it should be more than tedious. Collegial comment would be welcome.

sets of problems are strategic within this context: public administration, the nature of political interests, the politics of urbanization, and the interpenetration of politics and economics. They would permit, and sometimes require, linkages across the existing fields.

The Centrality of Administration

If students of politics, in this country and around the world, wish to observe power in action, then the crucial focus is discretion regarding the actual use of information, money or its surrogates, and force. These are the resources necessary to induce joint action, and they are found in every society. Their use is what I mean by the centrality of administration to power. Inverting Long's (1962) insight, *administration is the lifeblood of power*. This is not the "public administration" of a merely technical logic. The issue is still relevant to many governments in the world, including some at the sub-national level in the United States. From the point of view of the organization of control, one can develop a much deeper agenda of research.¹² Within "public administration," four matters appear to me of fundamental importance: the mechanisms of power, public opinion and public administration, public administration and the plural society, and the politics of prosecution.

Three Mechanisms of Power. The expectation is that if one takes all the units in the world called "nation-states," one will discover two mechanisms of power, and in some societies a third.

Mechanism 1 is the structure for giving and receiving executive direction at very high levels. We may think of it as aggregating data that will motivate authorities at the highest level, allow them to engage in decision making, and announce, declare, or proclaim their decisions. This structure is triangular. There is a central or chief executive: president, king, prince, pope, prime minister, and so on. There is an "entourage" (which more conventional political science language used to call "staff"), a network of "friends and cronies," "young servants," and "migratory technocrats" floating around the chief executive.¹³ The third part of this structure consists of operating entities in the giving and receiving

of executive direction. In the United States, the presidency (in which the president is the center but not the totality) is mechanism 1, but every nation-state has a mechanism 1, as does every state (and most local governments of any size).

Within this mechanism is a simple process that I designate as "bargaining and command." Presidents (or the chief executives in other systems) have a common feature. They are human beings with biological and psychological demands upon them, just as other human beings are. They operate with conceptions of free choice (authority and power to do whatever they think right), but they are also subject to organizational demand from the aggregate of subordinates about what is wise and right. They are also subject to demands from the world outside official government.

Delegation, formal and informal, acknowledged and unacknowledged, enters into the decision-making process. Between chief executives and official subordinates there is a continuous and simultaneous process of bargaining and command. This is not a research finding but a synthetic statement based upon what we know (or at least what I know) from the written record. Research can be planned and executed to elaborate and test the formulation against any political system in the world for which there is any chance of obtaining data. There is likely to be some variation based upon culture, legal authority, and so forth. The president of Finland has more power within Finnish government than the president of the United States has within American government, but neither can be wholly exempt from the generalization. The formulation is also testable against the transactions between the president of the United States, the presidential entourage, and the operating agency heads (secretaries and others) from 1789 to now.

I make two disclaimers and a bold claim. Disclaimer 1: I know little, if anything, more of President Clinton than does any other member of our discipline, and so far as I know, he has no reason to know my name. Disclaimer 2: I know even less of George Stephanopoulos. Claim: I know George Stephanopoulos and knew him before President Clinton knew him. This is not extrasensory perception or second sight. *Stephanopoulos fits my model as the ambitious young servant. This conclusion stands solely on the evidence of his own published work and the known public record* (Stephanopoulos 1999).

Mechanism 1 embodies, among other things, the fact of intercollective (interagency/"bureaucratic") politics, which is remarkably widespread. What makes mechanism 1 attractive, moreover, is that I can hope for intertemporal, international comparisons. For example, it can be applied to the Roman empire, for the period described in Fergus Millar's (1992) wonderful account of the emperor as a working official, not a movie character. Similarly, from the work of Conyers Read (1960, 1961), Sir John Neale (1953), and others, it can be applied to government under Elizabeth I.

Mechanism 1 sometimes involves democracy, but not necessarily. The extreme case is Nazi Germany,

¹² This can be said if there is effective public government. I note that there is great discussion today of "privatization" and a "New Public Management." The resonance of this language was made clearer to me in a conversation with R. A. W. Rhodes at the meeting of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom in March 1999. My thesis, however, is that privatization does nothing to alter the basic pattern except one of two things. (1) It reduces the scope of public government, and in that event transfers power to the corporation or some nonprofit form of private government. (2) It keeps the scope of public government in form, maintaining the form of policymaking at the highest level, and delegated, assigned, or contracted program decisions and operational detail decision to some private entity. I benefited from separate discussions of the same general subject with Lawrence Howard, who, given his values and epistemological assumptions, expressed discouragement, and with Michael B. Preston, who merely treated the issue clinically.

¹³ This formulation turns out to be convergent with studies of high level executive decision making being conducted by a group of psychiatrists (Volkan et al. 1998, 160-1).

whose propaganda systems surely were the antithesis of democracy. Yet, the competing propaganda organizations reportedly fought among themselves during the war, and Hitler—*der Fuhrer*, remember!—was reluctant to intervene and avoided seeing the combatant agency chiefs when he could.

Mechanism 2, considered generically, meets the problem of field administration. Again, the potentiality for systematic comparison is enormous. One cannot conceive a world without field administration any more than one can conceive a world without some system for food distribution. If central decision makers could dispose of these resources perfectly, then central control should always result. Those who are granted authority in the field are presumed to act upon decision premises adopted by central decision makers. Max Weber's model of bureaucracy fits what people came to believe, at any rate.

All over the world, however, we encounter observations that tell us there is a fruitful potentiality in the study of imperfect hierarchy. Terminology is not well established for administrative practices that do not accord with the pure model of central control. The terminology that I adopt here to express some vertical stratification, but imperfect degrees of hierarchy, is "devolution" and "negotiated power-sharing." Imperfect hierarchy sometimes is precisely displayed where the theory of hierarchy is most explicit. Imperfect hierarchy is obvious but has not always been accepted into theories of administration, although in the past decade and a half American scholars concerned with implementation have rediscovered, and to some extent reemphasized, "nonhierarchical decision making" (Levin and Ferman 1985). But as political scientists we may encourage students to look more broadly, for the imperfection of hierarchy is more pervasive, in many other polities.

The actions of those who are supposed to be subordinates may deviate from what central decision makers would have preferred for at least five reasons: (1) subordinates lack the physical or mental ability to perform what the central decision maker would require; (2) field-level decision makers have been given a bigger job than they can possibly handle; (3) the field administrator is protecting his or her own *self-interest*, in the narrowest sense; (4) field administrators do not agree with what they have been told to do and implement the orders in ways that are more satisfactory by their own lights; and (5) field administrators feel driven to modify, or reinterpret, their orders or compliance procedures, in accord with the local environment, so as to attract support from people who will not, in their opinion, comply with the orders as initially issued.

Devolution is essentially a bargain between the most central decision maker and the principal field subordinates, who by law, fiction, or custom are allowed dependent positions of rulership. It also involves the willingness and ability of the superior to intervene, punish, and even replace the subordinate official who does not toe the line, or who becomes ineffective. The bargain that is entered provides the benefits of office and the protection of the superior authority in ex-

change for the field ruler's willingness and ability to execute the controls, practices, and policies that the central authority desires.

Negotiated power-sharing (or what is called "inter-governmental relations" [IGR] in the United States) arises when the "superior" level of government has some incentive to offer for a means of action other than compulsion but is not willing to let the subordinate unit have completely free rein. It must mitigate demands it might otherwise then make. More than three decades ago, Michael Lipsky (1982) offered the concept of street-level bureaucracy to describe the transactions between the *N*th official in the authority structure and the outside persons with whom an official entity deals.

Practice at this level reveals social realities, even to a degree that those who articulate social doctrine may wish to deny. What is to be said of rights when a police officer can, within station precincts, not merely beat a prisoner but jab a stick into the prisoner's anus?¹⁴ What of Waco?¹⁵

Austin Ranney once observed that most people "almost never see anyone or have dealings with anyone other than 'administrators.'" ¹⁶ The "social constitution" is manifested in the daily transactions between those who exercise administrative discretion and those with whom they deal.

Mechanism 3 exists in some polities but not others. It is the optional institutions and processes through which constraints are imposed upon administration. Constraint is limitation, but it is also imperative direction. The distinction between "constitutional" or "democratic" governmental systems, as we now use those terms, and others is whether there are mechanisms for effective constraints. Collective bodies (legislatures or assemblies) are the principal constraining institutions, but adjudicative bodies (courts) also provide means for this end result.

In the American case, at the national level, constraint is notably present in the congressional process. Conceptually, there are four types of transactions between Congress and the executive branch: (1) for the purpose of achieving some legislation; (2) for the purpose of helping constituents ("intermediation"); (3) for the purpose of "oversight" in the more technical sense of getting better administrative performance or service; and (4) for the infliction of pain upon some executive, some set of executive subordinates, or others (regardless of whether the body has any constitutional authority to inflict pain).

The peculiar power of the U.S. Congress, incomparably the most powerful collective body in the world, is directly related to its deep engagement, through vari-

¹⁴ This refers to a New York City police matter in 1999 which is now in the public reports and on which I have not carried out a detailed analysis.

¹⁵ Various allegations have been made about the conduct of federal field agents in the Branch Davidian matter in 1993. The case had yielded, by the time of writing, much senatorial criticism of Attorney General Janet Reno, much reported (but not verified) conflict between the attorney general and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the appointment as special counsel of former U.S. senator John Danforth.

¹⁶ Letter to the author, March 25, 1969.

ous constraint procedures, in the administrative process. Congressional investigation is a means by which Congress exercises particular influence upon the administrative process. Upon close review, it appears that at the moment there is no collective judgment among students of the legislative process about this form of congressional power.

There is a small residue of lost knowledge on the congressional investigative power, since Marshall Dimock (1929) wrote a pioneering study near the time of Teapot Dome. Dimock and two other political scientists from prior to World War II wrote books that are "lost" in the sense that no one reads them much now (Dimock 1929; Eberling 1928; McGeary 1940). In the twentieth century, the number of investigations has, presumably, been vast. I have seen no specific accounting. Nelson McGeary's (1940, 9) study, about a dozen years after Dimock's book came out, reported 146 investigations in a ten-year period. Some material is available to us in three encyclopedia articles (Johnson 1995; Relyea 1995; Tiefer 1995); a very informative account by a participant-observer of the work of the Church Committee, a Senate committee that investigated the Central Intelligence Agency during and immediately after the Nixon administration (Johnson 1988); and one synoptic review of high publicity investigations since World War II (Mayhew 1991).

There is considerable opportunity to regain lost knowledge and to extend discovery by a deeper search into how the congressional investigation has developed and changed in the United States¹⁷ as well as a great opportunity and need for further inquiry. The question of what functions investigation now serves or accomplishes, and of what the functional equivalents are in other political systems are extremely important. Here is a momentous opportunity for some energetic scholar.

Public Opinion and Public Administration. The second area I find particularly compelling is public administration and public opinion. If public opinion is fundamental, then we should expect its manifestations in all the processes of politics (adjudication, legislation, administration).¹⁸ Let me offer a set of reasoned conjectures.

¹⁷ I reach this conclusion after extensive review of electronic search sources, notably J-STOR, Social Science Abstracts, and Public Affairs Information Service. In particular, in July 1999, I reviewed J-STOR for all articles on "congressional investigation" published from 1940 through 1999 in journals in political science, history, economics, and sociology. That relatively broad search yielded a total of 89 articles for the sixty-year period, in the four disciplines. Dissertation Abstracts (1983–99) shows 116 entries. Most of these entries have nothing to do with congressional investigation, but come up as artifacts of the indexing system. If they mentioned either *congressional* or *investigation*, the system identified them. My supposition has been, however, that there must be other research of which I am unaware. Accordingly, I consulted some half dozen leading scholars in congressional studies and generally found agreement that my search had about exhausted the actual material.

¹⁸ Beryl Radin (personal communication) points out that this is now very important to American public administrators, shell-shocked by other political attacks. Radin also notes ambiguities in the definition of public opinion. Patrick J. Wolf (personal communication) offers other useful comments, including the normative challenge as to whether public opinion should play a role inside administration. I

First, there is a coercive quality to public opinion. It imposes demands and prohibitions on and expresses tolerances for various actions and results. Public opinion tends, when issues are taken seriously, to a form in which debate produces great anger; side A speaks as if it wished to destroy side B. If both sides are serious, then we should expect an agency to suffer considerable pain if it chooses a decision preferred by one side, but it may be under great pressure to do exactly that. Charles McCarthy (1912, 180), writing about Wisconsin state government, stated that public sentiment might force regulatory commissions to deal perhaps harshly with regulated companies, but ultimately the companies would be protected by the courts.

Second, the power of culture over opinion is that culture underlies opinion, at least the sort of opinion that is normally measured (and perhaps the sort that is measurable). The significance of such cultural values is frequently ignored by students of administration as well as by students of public opinion. Perhaps in the rapidly emerging techniques of research there are much better instruments than poll data. But I have asserted—and not yet tested—that poll data are similar to the surface froth at the ocean known as whitecaps; what truly is important for the continuing public administrator are the beliefs and feelings more analogous to deep ocean currents.

Third, the variety of means for introducing public opinion into the administrative process is very wide: the actions of collective bodies (legislatures or otherwise), common gossip and other means of cultural communication, extralegal and illegal actions, interest groups, legal processes such as hearings and complaint procedures, opinion surveys (Key 1961), and so on.

Fourth, administrative agencies purposely act to influence opinion, which one recent private commentator noted on the draft of a cognate paper as "political entrepreneurialism." The various activities intended to produce opinion amount to public relations or propaganda (in both the narrowest and the broadest senses); the reinterpretation of any given proposal to presumptive larger policy; the reinterpretation of data to fit new circumstances; the cooperation with external organizations on favorable terms; and, on the controlling side, censorship and information control (leaking as a form of control) as well as pejorative rhetoric.

Public Administration and the Plural Society. Most states, for most of human history, have been multiethnic, not homogeneous. This is true even for Western Europe. Therefore, administrators (who have the capacity to make decisions about the definition, collection, dissemination, and use of information) will act in situations such that their purposes, interactions, and consequences will be varied as to ethnic effect. Accordingly, their actions will be varied as to consequences for political stability, change, and viability.

The Politics of Prosecution. In the terms of Merriam's (1926) agenda, prosecution is a variant on constitu-

similarly acknowledge helpful written comment by Paul Freedman and face-to-face comment by Christopher Wlezien.

tional law. The potential for convergence in the politics of prosecution of American politics, public administration, comparative politics, and international politics lies in the parameters, forms of action, and products and consequences of action by government lawyers (in the American case) against other persons.

The prosecutorial function represents great intellectual opportunity. The power of someone or some institution (1) to make some person or institution (2) present itself before some entity (3) upon some pain for failing to do so is crucial. The prosecutor applies controlled and subdued force, exercised through the forms of law, to threaten the loss of freedom, secure that loss, take away money by requiring one to spend for defense, deprive one of peace of mind and quiet sleep, and ruin good reputation. While all the powers of the prosecutor are important, the prosecutor, more than any other, is the official with the power and authority to inflict a scandal by the mere circulation of information that action is being considered.

Prosecution depends upon the collective reaction to the intersection of an act deemed an offense (since there can be no crime without a prior law), the party by whom the act is committed (the offender), the party against whom the act is committed (the victim), and the rest of the collectivity. The question is whether the rest of the collectivity thinks this intersection demands reward, penalty, or neutrality.

The more factionalism increases, the more prosecution will be a part of the struggle. For example, the discussion of abolishing black slavery became, in the 1830s, truly subversive. White people who opposed immediate emancipation held up the fear that a vast black population, out of control, would wage war against the former masters. Whites identified as abolitionists became the objects of control and suppression by those who favored slavery or even those who said they favored "colonization." The issue was not black freedom but the suppression of white debate. Prosecution could play a part. In one account I have seen, a colonizationist district attorney was intent on making a case against an abolitionist and the dangers of immediate emancipation.¹⁹

I invite consideration of this issue from the students of comparative politics, who must have relevant evidence from a number of countries, particularly Italy and Korea, where heads of government or heads of state have been prosecuted in the context of severe domestic political controversy. Prosecution becomes, of course, irrelevant when the forms of political conflict depart from the symbolism of words and the forms of law. At that point, politics returns to its elemental form as force.

Public administration as restated here—in terms of mechanisms, public opinion, ethnic plurality, and prosecution—is emphasized as a logical, essential, central component of reframing a science of politics. I now

turn to another element of the political underpinning encompassed by Merriam's "Progress in Political Research," namely, his truncated suggestion about the nature of political interests.

The Nature of Political Interests

What Merriam meant by "the nature of political interests" is not fully explained. But the analysis of interest groups virtually always assumes the "interest" and focuses on the "group." Under Truman's (1951) adaptation of Arthur Bentley (1908), the interest group is inherent in all politics. At one level of thinking, I believe it would be useful to distill the major concepts, propositions, or implicit theory in Truman's book, separated from his data, which necessarily are time bound. The essentials then could be reviewed point by point in light of studies and specific findings that relate to them.

Baumgartner and Leech (1996, 523) offer a useful heuristic contribution. They critique an article that claims "to refute a prevailing wisdom that groups lobby legislators who already support them [and] conclude that groups tend to lobby those who oppose them, and lobby their supporters primarily to counteract lobbying by other groups." Their methods critique is impressive on its face.²⁰

There is a need at this stage in the collective research life of political scientists for a systematic comparison of the literature over several decades. Truman's (1951, chaps. 1–4) examination of groups starts with the role of groups in society and the circumstances of their activity in governing, and he drew heavily from social psychology and applied social anthropology. Broadly, he examined group organization and problems of leadership (the internal dynamics and cohesion of groups), their relations to government, and their tactics of influence (in different institutions), and he concludes with a view of group politics and representative democracy.

What of "interest" itself? In the deepest inquiry, we seek to identify the variables that will motivate political action before it occurs. In this respect, we should be looking for the driving forces of political action. Imagine that one is a consultant in Lagos, Nigeria. What should one look for in order to anticipate what the local authorities will do? One does not have sufficient knowledge if one has to depend on a catalog of existing groups.

Whether the presence of interest groups has the consequences that Lowi (1969) attributes and whether there is a possible adjustment are very important problems. But is interest truly so fundamental? Madison proposed that interest is universal, grounded in "human nature." If so, then there is a problem in discovering interest expression in a polity that does not even purport to be democratic. Most research is about

¹⁹ See Filler 1963, 75, n. 61; Goodell 1852, 437–8, which also cites Crandall 1836, 46. Filler also refers to Delaplaine 1937, 308. The trial, acquittal, self-exile, and death of Reuben Crandall are briefly described in Strane 1990.

²⁰ Indeed, though I discovered this article very late in revisions on my address, using J-STOR, I am surprised not to have found a response by the authors they critiqued. Perhaps it exists in some form other than an article (e.g., a letter) that would not have been identified by the search mode I used, i.e., asking for "articles."

the United States, then about the United Kingdom, and then about various forms of action in the advanced industrial countries since World War II.

Interest groups are largely conceived as “economic,” although neither Bentley nor Truman accepts this limitation. Hirschman (1977), however, discusses the arguments for “interest” as economic factors, more suitable to regimes than less rational passions or more emotional or extrarational behavior.

The Politics of Urbanization

I regard the politics of urbanization as one of the strategic areas that may now span the fields of American Politics and Comparative Politics. But this point should be placed against the specific background of Merriam’s address. Merriam argued that there has been great progress in the study of the problem of the modern city, progress related principally to the establishment of research entities that provided data to improve urban government. At the end of the twentieth century, students should recall what American cities were like at its beginning. Essentially, the city was a receptacle into which vast numbers of human beings poured rapidly from all over the world. The governance of the city was affected by the need to reconcile these multiple populations to each other. The governance was largely directed by the urban rich who controlled the economy (Almond 1998) and by the urban bosses who controlled the cities (Gosnell 1937; Gottfried 1962; McKean 1940; Zink 1930) and treated them as their own business enterprises. Students should know the practices of local politics. It may be “colorful” to tell stories of people who got jobs on the public payroll because they were diligent party workers. But those jobs were not free, waiting to be taken. They meant that others on the public payroll had to be fired, in a world where “equilibrium” included a good deal of unemployment.²¹ Merriam, the theorist turned politician, was with the reformers (Karl 1974). He thus could cite the work of Leonard D. White in developing the study of public administration—chiefly the study of personnel, which White raised to an art form—as an alternative to absolute patronage politics. Merriam thus celebrated the rise of research institutions that provided data and arguments to support reform of city government, in the attempt to overcome the use of the city as a place for the boss to get rich.

²¹ Colleagues will have to endure one anecdote that I deem relevant. Somewhere around the time of the Truman administration, when the old system still existed but was collapsing, I assisted the precinct captain in the 115th Precinct of the 2d Ward Regular Democratic Organization. One resident on our block, Mrs. Walker, lived with her grandchildren and son-in-law, and she was a vigorous, outspoken, Republican. My precinct captain (Albert Grimes) was unhappy with her, though there was no chance the precinct would turn Republican. “We ought to be able to do something about her,” he said. “Her son-in-law works for the city, doesn’t he?” The son-in-law was a driver on the Chicago Transit Authority. Under the conditions that then existed, however, nothing seems ever to have happened, but Mr. Grimes’s presumption was that something could happen and that it would have been legitimate for him to have gotten the Ward Committeeman to take the necessary action.

From the 1930s into the 1960s, for a variety of reasons, urban politics was not a growth field in political science (Herson 1957). Its revival in the 1950s with a vast amount of research on urban politics (Banfield 1960; Sayre and Kaufman 1960), metropolitan areas (Wood 1964), and notably on the “community power” themes (Dahl 1962; Hunter 1953; Long 1962) can easily be retraced by those who wish. These themes are revisited by Clarence Stone (1989) and those who are persuaded of his approach to “urban regimes.” There are, in my estimation, three main threads in the political science that deals with the problems of the modern city: the city as the miniature polity, the city as local government, and the city as a manifestation of the process of urbanization. The last offers the important intellectual opportunity at this stage of the discipline.

Urbanization is important now for three reasons. First, it simply expresses the increase in scale, with the issues about participation as scale goes up (Dahl 1967, 953–70). That would be important itself. But, second, urbanization also yields a version of the Hobbesian problem of making and maintaining commonwealths because it means the drawing into one territorial area, over which control has to be exercised, multiple populations from diverse geographical, cultural, and ethnic settings. In other words, human population is not only more dense, but the multiple social systems are more closely packed together. It is likely that this becomes a more and more compelling human problem as the part of the world that is not rich becomes urbanized. Third, the politics of urbanization is qualitatively different because the very fact of urbanization produces a major shift in our relationship to the physical environment, and thus produces qualitatively different problems of conflict and decision making. Urbanization and the environmental problem are not identical, but they are intimately related.

The Interpenetration of Politics and Economics

In discussing a variety of big public problems, Merriam (1926, 8) maintained that “neither the facts and technique of economics alone, nor of politics alone, nor of history alone, are adequate to their analysis and interpretation.” The issue that I raise is the interpretation of politics through contemporary neoclassical theory.²² Coase (1988) refers explicitly to “the economic theory of politics,” and Williamson (1996, 251–2) refers to “the use of economic reasoning to examine politics and

²² I merely note but do not analyze here the controversy between missionaries of “rational choice” (Green and Shapiro 1995) and dedicated opponents of “rational choice” (Friedman 1996). It is important, but I cannot treat it here, and I hope to get to it at some other time and place. It is rather similar to the controversy between “behavioralists” and “institutionalists” in the later 1950s and 1960s, in that the dispute is confused and exaggerated. People say very similar things to praise their fellow believers and to criticize those who do not believe. It is expected to have considerable consequence for individuals and their futures. Finally, *much of what is said has little to do with the exercise of power*. Perhaps I may change my mind upon further study.

political institutions." Political relationships can be stated and reasoned about using economics terminology. That which is absolutely fresh is, of course, a net advantage to all, if it is actually knowledge.

Perhaps we might call this approach the Neoclassical Economic Politics (NEP). Some colleagues of extraordinary talent and achievement may not believe there is knowledge that remains independent of adopting economics per se as our guidepost (Alt and Shepsle 1990). I am respectfully skeptical. On the one hand, it is right that we learn more about economic concepts and the practical workings of the market system. On the other hand, I think it is absolutely wrong to set political science students adrift upon the neoclassical sea with no compass. The first objection is that neoclassical economics, which is now being imported as a source of guidance on politics, is grounded in the most extraordinary political innocence.

James Buchanan (1992) provides the evidence for this innocence. At the technical level, he was a student of public finance. His work was influenced by certain Italian economists, he says, because they "routinely modeled political decision structures as part of their work" (pp. 82–4). The sentence comes from his autobiography,²³ but the Italian influence can be found in some of his writing on public finance (Buchanan 1987, chap. 10, esp. 128–9). Buchanan expressly separates himself from the U.S. tradition that treated government as a "monolithic and benevolent" actor. If that is what English-speaking economists taught their students, then they could have abandoned it a long time ago.

Economists, at least in America, have ignored political knowledge that could have been theirs. That is, they have simply rejected the institutionalism of such economists as John Maurice Clark (1957). Williamson (1996, n. 2), a leading figure in the new institutional restatement, has the following mild comment in a footnote about a view expressed by Coase: "Some concluded, too harshly I think, that the work of American institutionalists led to nothing . . . [since] without a theory, they had nothing to pass on." In other words, Williamson thinks there is some intellectual value to the institutionalist residue. In short, economists had another intellectual structure to protect, and they could not protect it if they allowed politics to enter their considerations.²⁴

All they needed to escape that blind spot was interest group politics. The only reasonable inference is that economists as a group made a collective professional decision not to learn interest group politics. People have known about interest group politics in a general way for a long time. Merriam targeted it as a potential research topic in the 1925 address. Childs (1930) and Herring (1929) published relevant work in the 1920s. Schattschneider (1935) wrote on the issue at the beginning of the 1930s, using an economic subject, the tariff,

as his source of material. Truman produced his masterful synthesis in 1951,²⁵ of which there have been many criticisms, but for which there is yet no intellectual replacement incorporating research over the past two decades.

The second difficulty is that there are aspects of economics that economists seem no longer to need to know, but these are important to students of politics. There is no reason to start with economists' concepts per se, especially as it has so often proved necessary to modify them in order to adapt them to observed politics. The adoption of economists' concepts may well be analogous to merging with a firm that is constantly restating its assets. Economists may have no need to reexamine the role of poverty in the thinking of Alfred Marshall, the history of the fight between abstract theorists and institutionalists in the United States, the long struggle between the followers of John Maynard Keynes and the followers of the Austrians and Lionel Robbins. Since the history of economic thought is disappearing from curricula, economists themselves will soon be of no value on those issues. But political scientists who absorb economics as their guidepost have such a need.

Political scientists have the capacity to contribute to broader human understanding. Their proper premise is the interpenetration of politics and economics and, in some respects, the primacy of politics over economics. The competence of political science should be enhanced and carried to a political science of industrial organization. I do not mean that nothing else is relevant, for that is shallow in the extreme. I do mean that the political scientist who starts from political science concepts will make a contribution and will discover other things of relevance. Three areas of inquiry seem reasonable: the corporation, industry sectors, and the larger arena.

Corporate Governance. Opportunities for inquiry about the interpenetration of economics and politics abound in the subject of corporate governance. This is not a new idea. It is expressed in Drucker's (1978, 262–3) writing during World War II, although Drucker believes it hurt him academically. It is expressed in a different manner in the behavioral theory of the firm, as set forth by Cyert and March (1963).

Here are some practical examples. Within the world of the American corporation, the chief executive officer (CEO) is well known. As an initial point, there would be great merit in study of the tenure and turnover of CEOs. Then there would be merit in the study of how CEOs operate, as we also have a professional interest in how public executives operate. The mythology of the CEO as absolute boss, within the limits of the law, is

²³ Buchanan cites, to this point, Viti de Marco 1936.

²⁴ My recollection is that one reason Aaron Wildavsky studied the budgetary process was his dissatisfaction with the budgetary writing of Arthur H. Smithies.

²⁵ When a Nobel Prize is created, at some remote point, for political science, Truman's *The Governmental Process* (1951) will deserve that prize. Admittedly, others would make other choices. Fiorina (1996, 91) speculated on the idea of Mancur Olson as such a designee. I assume Fiorina was thinking of Olson as the economist that he was. It is ironic that Olson should receive so much attention for a book that is chiefly a contribution in political science and one that is both brilliant and dubious at the same time.

everywhere. Moreover, there is a tendency for CEOs to become increasingly self-assured as they continue in office. This sometimes yields conflicts with boards or directors and, at other times, may lead boards to be acquiescent. But where is the norm in practice? (See Newman 1996.) If one adopts the “bargaining and command” model from the public sector, what would the significant differences be?²⁶

One would expect (predict) the CEO function to be affected by changes in the technological, demographic, and cultural environment of the firm. Technology arguably is a factor altering the role. The greater reliance on information technology creates another seat at some corporate executive committees for a chief information officer (CIO), but I do not know exactly how that works. Nor does anyone else.

Legal requirements, accounting requirements, and investor expectations affect the relationship of the CEO to the chief financial officer (CFO). The CEO function should be somewhat restricted, one would predict, by the growing demand by others in the investment world for better information on finances and internal management. This demand, in turn, leads to an additional demand that the CEO accept an independent audit committee in the board of directors. The audit committee chair is the only person with authority to ask questions directly of any corporate officer, without the clearance of the CEO. Indeed, in the United States, the chair might be legally liable if s/he sought such clearance. Different legal environments in some other countries, such as the United Kingdom, would also be relevant.

Industry-Level Relationships. An industry is not only a set of “economic” transactions but also a functioning political system in which people have ongoing relationships (Hamilton 1957, 6). When a large manufacturer is short of the product that the market demands, it can ration by price, or it can tell steady customers that it will deliver to each some proportion (“allocation”) of what was ordered until production increases. This procedure could easily be understood by anyone who deals with the normal realms of politics.

In economic organization, one political dimension is the constant tendency toward oligopoly at the industry level, the manner in which some firms acquire chokeholds by dominating some segment of the industry (such as smelting in the copper industry). The financial community is a notable place for such examination, and we could have some evaluation of which firms provide leadership in the financial community to a greater degree than others and the structuring of syndicates (other than the objectively measurable considerations and alliance patterns within the financial community). Those who raise money, those who certify value, and those who attest to legal validity surely are involved in some dynamic political exchange.

The Larger Arena. There are, of course, questions of public politics and public policy as well as their effects on the internal governance of the corporation. Such rules are interpreted and changed, in the functioning market economy, to protect or advance “high-risk” projects that the pure free market would never sustain. Three examples are the civilian nuclear power program, the proposed Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System, and the synthetic fuels program, all adopted by Congress during the second half of the Carter administration.

Geoffrey Miller (1998), a lawyer, recently published an article in a corporate governance volume sponsored by the Sloan Foundation. The abstract states that it is harder to carry out a takeover in the United States than in the United Kingdom for two reasons. First, there is more room for antitakeover forces in state governments, whereas the centralized U.K. system squeezes those people out. Second, legal doctrine in the United States allows lawyers to make money out of takeovers, and thus “creates a strong interest group within the organized bar” (p. 629).

There is opportunity, and need, for inquiry into the politics of creating and sustaining different kinds of markets. Markets cannot exist without a definition of “mine and thine” and of the conditions under which “thine” becomes “mine.” Such rules, if not derived from sheer tradition, come by application of reason, but some are ultimately products of power. Markets, except in the most primitive sense, exist not in nature but in the rules (which is to say political choices) that human beings establish (Douglas 1962, 211–33).

What may be even more fundamental is the political conditions under which rules are changed to facilitate free markets. There still remains the important issue of how, in the political sense, the market system is created or sustained. How do we explain changes that create markets more favorable to “economically correct” results, since such changes necessarily impose at least short-term penalties upon many people?²⁷

The transformation of England from a rigidly regulated market at the time of Adam Smith to a more or less free market seventy years later, at the time of Corn Laws repeal, warrants study. So does the problem of land ownership in a country such as Nigeria, where individual title is not the norm. Suffice it to say that a host of questions—including creation of new categories of gainers and of losers—can be asked about in the former socialist countries. Perhaps something of this kind is occurring in American debates over the restructuring of the electric power industry (Holden 1995).

These four sets of problems—public administration, the nature of interests, the politics of urbanization, and the interpenetration of politics and economics—refer to substantive matters where the exercise of power is displayed. The methodologies that are appropriate may be “hard” or “soft,” but these are matters with which young scholars should be concerned as they

²⁶ Cyrus H. Holley, with whom I served on a corporate board for several years, read an article on this subject and said: “Oh, yes, I could apply that in my own company.”

²⁷ This general concept now takes operational reality in the experience of the former Soviet Union.

pursue their calling. We seek to enhance competence (capability) in order to achieve and maintain competence (domain).

UNORTHODOX AREAS

In the creation and maintenance of competence, we may, and I believe should, teach the need for coherence and direction, for strategic inquiry into the "unorthodox" portion of Merriam's formulation. These are all matters that, as students of power, we might fit into a coherent whole, and they are all matters that the young might be facilitated to study. But here I offer only a brief thought on force, passive resistance, and noncooperation.

As to where we should place high priority, I restate the view that politics is not merely a debate or a game, it is often a fight. From a moral point of view, the game is preferable to the debate, and the debate preferable to the fight, assuming the participants are on some equality with one another. From what we can observe and what has been recorded, however, that is far from the normal situation. This should be set against the concept of information as a political resource. Insofar as politics can be mainly a game, or possibly even a debate, there is great value in information. Existing and emerging empirical democratic theory is focused on information as a political resource. But politics is not always a process of persuasion or bargaining but of coercion (Pennock and Chapman 1972). I say nothing here of passive resistance, having given it too little thought. There may be colleagues who would prefer, on scientific or moral grounds, to begin with passive resistance and noncooperation rather than force. Force was where Merriam began, although he was aware of Gandhi.

THE OXENSTIERNA-MULLINS EFFECT

When the term "decision making" became an important political science concept, we also began to talk about rationality. Perhaps we borrowed too much (Holden 1996), one evidence of "too much" being the persistent belief that synoptic rationality can and should govern decision making. Vertzberger (1998), in a study of military interventions, argues that this principle is still believed by decision analysts. He thinks it should be rejected, which is why he undertook the study. Vertzberger (p. 407) thus urges that people making decisions know "the nature of the information" they are provided and know whether disagreements in risk assessment are "embedded in different informational bases" or are "judgmental" (different interpretations of the same information). The argument is persuasive, but the solution that decision makers should be trained to do this seems far from realistic. Can the world be stabilized so that heads of government can undergo such training? Can anyone fulfill the requirements of the challenge specified?

The problem is serious, and we can see many disastrous decisions in all walks of life. In general, those who do not think synoptic rationality is real have chosen to

accept "bounded rationality," which basically says that our limited thinking ability is what hinders us. The bounded rationality idea is useful, but it breaks down at some point. It does not show what I have named the Oxenstierna-Mullins effect.

Axel Oxenstierna was chancellor of Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus, during the Thirty Years' War (1618-48) (Wedgewood 1961). On one occasion he wrote his son: "My son, my son, if you knew with what little wisdom the world is ruled" (Myrdal 1965, 20). Moon Mullins was not so elegiac but equally forceful: "Results is what you expects and consequences is what you gits."

People often expect results and get consequences by virtue of their own bad decisions and the dynamics those decisions produce. The enemies of Julius Caesar destroyed him, the republic, and many of themselves. The ruling elites of Germany, Austria, and Russia blindly moved their countries into World War I, not without calculation but without much detailed advance calculation. They were not merely displaced as rulers but destroyed as elites and sometimes as persons. The Japanese elite before Pearl Harbor trembled, as Masao Maruyama (1969, 89) wrote, "at the possibility of failure, [but] still thrust their way forward with their hands over their eyes." The result was imperfect rationality to the extent of pathology.

Force is a crucial element in both domestic and international politics. Crucial does not mean "good," necessarily. Force often leads to one aspect that nearly all social observers undervalue. Merriam (1926, 5) said "I have sometimes thought it would be worthwhile to write a history of political unreason, folly, and prejudice, in order to balance sundry discourses on political theory, and offset the possible conclusion from them that all political action is likely to follow the lines of thought indicated by the great masters of systematic political speculation." The use of force is one situation in which people frustrate the future they wish to create by failures or serious imperfections in rationality. Sometimes, they create situations of foolishness, self-defeat, or pathology. The examples refer to very high-level decision makers, but the Oxenstierna-Mullins effect applies to low situations. What rationality requires a police officer severely to beat a prisoner, already under arrest and inside the confines of the police station?

THE OUTSIDE WORLD

The competence of political science is enhanced to the degree that we can reach into the real world beyond the graduate seminar, the journal, and the university press book. When there is an important change, we should be altered.

Opportunity to engage the larger world always exists, and sometimes that opportunity may be unwanted. People often expect a political scientist to have some knowledge or competence about a variety of governmental relationships and problems, which Elinor Ostrom (1998) has called collective action problems. When we are unable to take into account those needs,

the social options go to others. Engagement in the world beyond the academy is often intellectually valuable and professionally compatible. Two fields of political science do make practice claims, namely, public administration and international relations. (Although some colleagues must work in a language that most practical decision makers cannot use, there is no reason to discourage other colleagues who aspire to speak in the language of practice.) David Newsom, the recent Cumming Professor of Diplomacy at the University of Virginia, is a constant advocate of the view that contemporary publications are generally too remote to be used by people who are engaged in foreign policy.²⁸

Even when the language is standard English rather than mathematics, there is an additional impediment to understanding of those who write in scholarly terms. We cannot assume that the meaning of political science concepts will be obvious to practitioners. In part, this is just a question of semantics. The same word will often have different significance to scholars and to practitioners. But it is not just words. It will often happen that the problem perceived by one is invisible to the other and that the need for rapidity of decision will not seem the same to each. Political scientists may need at times to find some entry into the practice, for it is only in the world of practice that they will understand, and be understood by, practitioners. This is perhaps the same as the case that political scientists need to develop some equivalent of engineering, though that is an imprecise idea (Ordeshook 1996, 175–88, esp. 180–1 and 187–8; see also Dennison 1932).²⁹

Participant and/or advisory roles offer entry for political science into some worlds of practice. We know of political theorists (such as Machiavelli and Locke) who have held political posts, whether minor or major. But we need not go so far back. The earliest American example I can cite is Francis Lieber, who had a background in international law and finally persuaded the Army to let him write about the international law of land warfare in the Civil War period. The result was General Orders 100, establishing conduct of armies in the field, which students of international law say has had wide influence elsewhere (Freidel 1947, 336–40; Nys 1947, 355–93).

The advisory role has been adopted by a large number of our colleagues in one form or another. In the local government setting, for instance, the American political scientist who has the inclination is sure to be invited to participate in something. From there, nature will take its course. I am not certain this is so in other countries.³⁰ In most states, the flagship public

university (and sometimes other public universities) has a research agency that conducts practical research on such questions as the incidence of taxation in the state, the organization of local government, the state legislative process, and other relatively practical matters. Political scientists, and other scholars, who work in these entities sometimes develop intense knowledge of the state government and themselves become major figures in state affairs. In general, a fairly severe separation operates, so that the work such colleagues do seldom flows back into the main body of intellectual discussion. The young political scientist can be at some professional peril due to outside engagement. One result is that young people who have strong interests outside the academy simply leave because they are unlikely to meet all the internal requirements for promotion and tenure.

The bad result, intellectually, is that their experience is not often fed back into the political science analytical process. It is intellectually counterproductive for external success to preclude feedback into the political science community. The rigidity in our collective decision rules means that other realms—management science, decision theory, schools of public affairs, schools of public administration, schools of international relations—preempt a good deal of the work that we might undertake. This rigidity is not ordained by nature. It is a function of how our organizational realm works. It is within our capacity to alter the rules and often a major intellectual (thinking) issue is contained in the practical issue. What is the explanatory theory in political science that will offer some useful guidance to realistic action? This is an idea that it is imperative to accept, if students and ambitious young scholars are to be free of the terror that “practicality” will render them “inferior.” Tenure, salary, and prestige, as Ordeshook (1996, 188) rightly points out, cannot be withheld from people who allocate their time and energy to such work.

The last years of the twentieth century are not the first time we have faced this issue. Merriam’s reference to “legislation” was not principally to studies of the combinations and adjustments in lobbying, committee fights, and floor fights. When he says that “significant advances were made by . . . McCarthy, whose untimely death caused irreparable injury” (Merriam 1926, 2), he is referring to Charles McCarthy, who founded the legislative research organization in Wisconsin.

McCarthy soon came into the initial group that called the meeting to create the American Political Science Association. Their interest in “comparative legislation” was in material on the form and content of legislation from one country to another, so that drafters and legislators could make use of them. This practical side of the creation of the American Political Science Association itself is lost knowledge now, but it

²⁸ Newsom was a career Foreign Service officer who retired at the level of Undersecretary of State. A similar complaint is expressed in a letter to the president and president-elect of the association by Dr. Lloyd Etheredge.

²⁹ Harold Guetzkow expressed such an idea in the 1950s when I was a graduate student, although I do not know whether he ever gave it formal published form.

³⁰ Anthony King has (in personal conversation) told me that this kind of engagement is less likely in the United Kingdom than in the United States. I am, however, aware that such a colleague as L.J.

Sharpe (Nuffield College) was a member of the Oxford City Council, although whether this is a function of the special importance of Oxford University in Oxford itself is a question. Moshe Shani, when my temporary colleague some years ago, said that such engagement was much more common in Israel, perhaps as a small country with intense demands for highly educated competence and a strong claim on the moral engagement of its people.

cannot have been lost in 1925. Most of the original participants were still active, although Merriam himself was a subsequent member. McCarthy's short professional career (twenty years at the outside) illustrates the remarkable confluence of chance, personality, and structural forces in society.³¹

Prior to World War I, the APSA was persuaded to create a Committee on Practical Training for Public Service (first called the Committee on Laboratory Methods in Political Science), chaired by McCarthy.³² McCarthy felt that any University of Wisconsin faculty member ought to be available to help the legislature at request. This was the German system, according to McCarthy. He preferred it. Moreover, Fitzpatrick (1944) said, there was one annual report of the American Political Science Association saying that a time of public service should be a prerequisite to a Ph.D. It is not surprising that idea was defeated.

Avoidance of public engagement may be warranted on the grounds that one's freedom will be compromised. One certainly cannot speak as freely if one knows something, for there will be occasions when discretion is necessary. There is almost nothing to be said for avoidance on the basis of developing or maintaining intellectual competence.³³

We have an opportunity to enter more seriously into the popular culture, but we have to want to do so. Political science is where thoughtful people go, once they can no longer depend on their own common sense and on political journalists. It is where political journalists themselves go for interpretation deeper than they can get from "inside" sources. Political science shares its domain (area of competence) with history, law, and philosophy, with sociology, psychology, and anthropology. It may be surrendering vast portions to economics, as it once surrendered a great deal of the field of administration to engineering, business, management science, and others.

Political science has to compete with common sense political theory communicated principally in the general culture. It is structured by education from kindergarten through the twelfth grade. There is also the political theory conveyed in mass media. Executives are trained in business school political theory, although it is generally not conceived as "political" and often is not described as "theory." It is both.

"Judicio-political theory [is] enunciated in law class rooms, law reviews, reformulated in lawyers' briefs, and authoritatively expressed in judicial decisions" (Holden 1996), but is in need of some challenge. That means the immediate frontier may be legal education. Political

science already has, in its present content, a great deal to contribute to the education of lawyers, whose briefs will frame issues for judges, and of judges, who will decide the issues. The education of lawyers will be altered if law students and law professors debate political science.

Progress in political research also will call for some new thinking about interdisciplinarity. Merriam (1926, 8) was somewhat aware of that issue, as suggested by his list of basic problems, which would require combined efforts to resolve: "punishment and prevention of crime, alcoholism, the vexed question of human migration, the relations of the Negro, and a wide variety of agricultural and industrial problems." This would now be framed differently. Social scientists would likely speak of "the status of African Americans" or "the role of the blacks," or retreat to some other language about "color-blind" policies or "affirmative action," depending upon their ideological commitment. Little appears to be written on the assumption that the pattern of white-black transactions has *any* important connection to the viability of the United States as a political system. African Americans and European Americans, as groups, coexist as if they were two "nations" within one governmental authority. This calls for serious political analysis, not moral analysis (Holden 1999). The white-black relationship is not as intractable as that between the opposing sides in Northern Ireland, but it is far more so than most people appear to suppose. There is no more important social science problem, with ramifications for human societies around the world, than developing a more fundamental concept of how to create peace between large groups between whom there is a diffused hostility.

The National Science Foundation's (NSF) leadership has recently emphasized interdisciplinary research on major public problems. Political scientists might note, for instance, the term "biocomplexity," used by Dr. Rita Colwell, who believes "it will take biologists, computer scientists, engineers, and surely those in the behavioral sciences to understand the signals for survivability."³⁴ She added that "no problems exist in isolation, whether they are scientific, social, or technical. More often, they are all three at once." NSF's Assistant Director for Social and Behavioral Sciences Bennett Bertenthal even spoke in public of a "Manhattan Project" approach to major problems and urged the social sciences to prepare to take a role so that they would not be overrun by the other sciences.

Human heredity and nonhuman environment have been the outer limits of politics. Contemporary biology raises issues about the heredity parameter that make it appear far less rigid than once thought. A similar point should be made about the biogenetic engineering of crops, which has already raised regulatory process issues in Europe (Barboza 1999).

³¹ Charles McCarthy, a young man from Brockton, MA, had gotten a Ph.D. in history from Wisconsin in 1907 (Fitzpatrick 1944).

³² Lowell (1910, 11) also speaks respectfully of "the bureau of legislation at Madison," but he seems to have thought of it as a means to produce more accurate statistics for political scientists.

³³ Indeed, John Maynard Keynes was never the pure academician. Of the first thirteen years of his professional life, six were spent as a titular civil servant, and at least four on very active duty. When he returned to Cambridge, he spent part of his time in London and engaged in public affairs for the rest of his life. The details are given in his obituary (Harris 1947, xviii).

³⁴ Address to the American Institute of the Biological Sciences, August 1998.

CONCLUSION

I have suggested what young scholars should be encouraged to pursue in the intellectual realm and how the organizational realm might be adapted to the highest improvement of the intellectual realm.

First, political science has a certain competence in that its domain is the study of politics (the organization of power), and about that domain it has competence. It is important always to seek a means to contribute to science, but certain disciplines are more or less capable in some terms or certain areas than are others. At any moment, however, a body of scholars in a given line of work can do what they can and can make very serious efforts to do new things better.

Second, Merriam set forth a number of ideas, some of which have been substantially fulfilled, and some of which have not. The most significant change has occurred in "the field of method." Quantitative and/or mathematical analysis is so pervasive that I think it worthwhile to speak of its triumph. The triumph has yielded good results, but it also has had very important side effects that diminish competence.

Third, the enhancement of competence, which is always our valid purpose, is likely to be served by coherent and strategic focus on some areas identified in the Merriam program that now are considered conventional but lend themselves to further development. The strategic areas have to do with the exercise of power and lie in the fields of public administration, political interests, the politics of urbanization, and the interpenetration of politics and economics.

Fourth, the Merriam formulation also lends itself to serious inquiry in unorthodox subjects, which are not necessarily part of the conventional agenda: (1) force, passive resistance, and noncooperation, (2) the nature of political interests, (3) magic, superstition, and ceremonialism, (4) propaganda, (5) conference, (6) maintenance of morale, (7) leadership, obedience, and cooperation, and (8) the causes of war.

I also place some emphasis on political science inquiry into force and foolish, irrational, and pathological decision making (the Oxenstierna-Mullins effect). Force (and its opposites) has a certain importance, particularly if one does not operate with a theory in which information is the central political variable. In this respect, I depart somewhat from the norm.

Finally, a component of competence that I extract from the Merriam formulation is that of extending the reach of political science into the world beyond the graduate seminar, the journal, and the university press. This means that our decision rules—ultimately expressed in pay and prestige and made or implemented by deans, chairs, promotion and tenure committees, and journal editors in the aggregate—should be altered to allow a higher degree of external engagement. This external search is not simply to further career opportunities; practical problems involve issues that evoke the most serious theoretical effort. That, in a certain way, is the ultimate indicator of the competence of political science.

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