

I work in a society where as a writer everything goes and nothing matters, while [in Europe] nothing goes and everything matters.

Phillip Roth

Professor: Aleksander Lust

Time: TR 2:00-3:15pm

Office hours: TR 12:30-1:45pm & W 2:00-5:00pm

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This course provides an overview of the political development of Europe since World War II. We will begin by studying the enduring features of West European political and economic systems, such as parliamentary democracy, class voting, and the welfare state. We will then talk about the changes in East European politics since 1945, from the Communist seizure of power to the collapse of Communism and its troubled aftermath. We will conclude by exploring the common challenges facing Western and Eastern Europe today, such as regional integration, immigration, and the rise of nationalism. Throughout the course, we will consider the relevance of social science theories for the European experience and compare developments in Europe and the United States.

Readings

Please buy the following books at the University Bookstore and **bring them to class**:

- Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi, *The Future of Europe: Reform or Decline* (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2006)
- Ivan Berend, *Central and Eastern Europe, 1944-1993: Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
- Markus M. L. Crepaz and Jürg Steiner, *European Democracies*, **8th edition** (Boston: Pearson 2013)

Additional required readings are available on electronic reserve at Belk Library (**R**).

Requirements

The course grade is based on participation (20%), an open-book midterm (20%), a 10-page paper (20%), and an open-book final (40%). Participation includes your contributions to class discussions, 2 film reviews, and 5 closed-book quizzes on the readings, graded pass/fail.

Policies

You are allowed four absences. No make-up quizzes are given and late film reviews are not accepted. Make-up exams are only given in documented emergencies (e.g., a major illness). Late papers are marked down by 1/3 of a grade per day (e.g., from B to B-).

How to Use Electronic Reserve (R)

Several important readings are on electronic reserve, which you can access as follows:

1. Go to the university home page and click on Library
2. Click on Reserves under Find
3. Click on By Instructor and type Lust
4. Click on PS 4741
5. Click on the text you wish to read
6. Type your e-mail address and password
7. Print out the text and bring it to class

Statement on Student Engagement with Courses

In its mission statement, Appalachian State University aims at “providing undergraduate students a rigorous liberal education that emphasizes transferable skills and preparation for professional careers” as well as “maintaining a faculty whose members serve as excellent teachers and scholarly mentors for their students.” Such rigor means that the foremost activity of Appalachian students is an intense engagement with their courses. **In practical terms, students should expect to spend two to three hours of studying for every hour of class time. Hence, a fifteen hour academic load might reasonably require between 30 and 45 hours per week of out-of-class work.**

Academic Integrity Code

I. Introduction

Appalachian State University’s Academic Integrity Code is designed to create an atmosphere of trust, respect, fairness, honesty, and responsibility. The Academic Integrity Code outlines “user-friendly” procedures and mechanisms for resolving alleged violations of academic integrity. The Academic Integrity Code is the result of cooperation among Appalachian’s faculty, students, and administrators, and promotes a campus dialogue about academic integrity. All members of the Appalachian State University community are responsible for promoting an ethical learning environment.

II. The Academic Integrity Code

Students attending Appalachian State University agree to abide by the following Code:

- Students will not lie, cheat, or steal to gain academic advantage.
- Students will oppose every instance of academic dishonesty.

Students shall agree to abide by the Academic Integrity Code when submitting the admission application.

Disability Services

Appalachian State University is committed to making reasonable accommodations for individuals with documented qualifying disabilities in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. If you have a disability and may need reasonable accommodations in order to have equal access to the University’s courses, programs and activities, please contact the Office of Disability Services (828.262.3056 or www.ods.appstate.edu). Once registration is complete, individuals will meet with ODS staff to discuss eligibility and appropriate accommodations.

Schedule

August 16-18: What Is Europe?

Richard Wike, "Anti-Americanism Down in Europe, but a Values Gap Persists," December 4, 2012, www.pewglobal.org (**handout**)

Crepaz and Steiner, 1-16

Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1996), 53-76 (**R**)

Mark Lilla, "Slouching Toward Mecca," *The New York Review Of Books*, April 2, 2015 (**R**)

QUIZ 1!

August 23-25: Culture and Society

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in Patrick O'Neil and Ronald Rogowski, *Essential Readings in Comparative Politics*, 4th edition (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2013), 469-475 (**R**)

Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 47-69 (**R**)

Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism*, 2nd edition (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2010), 95-128 (**R**)

September 1-3: Cleavages and Parties

Crepaz and Steiner, 17-63

André Krouwel, "Otto Kirchheimer and the Catch-All Party," *West European Politics*, 26, 2 (April 2003), 23-40 (**R**)

The Economist, "For the Birds," September 29, 2012 (**R**)

Film: Stephen Leigh, *Margaret Thatcher: The Iron Lady* (1999)

FILM REVIEW 1 DUE!

September 6-8: Parliaments and Elections

Crepaz and Steiner, 64-90

Maurice Duverger, “The Number of Parties,” in O’Neil and Rogowski, 436-440 (R)

Arend Lijphart, “Constitutional Choices for New Democracies,” in O’Neil and Rogowski, 213-222 (R)

The Economist, “The View from the North,” May 23, 2015 (R)

September 13-15: Corporatism

Crepaz and Steiner, 178-202

Alesina and Giavazzi, 79-100

Baldur Thorhallsson and Rainer Kattel, “Neo-Liberal Small States and Economic Crisis: Lessons for Democratic Corporatism,” *The Journal of Baltic Studies* 44, 1 (January 2013), 83-103 (R)

The Economist, “A Machine Running Smoothly,” February 3, 2011 (R)

QUIZ 2!

September 20-22: The Welfare State

Crepaz and Steiner, 203-226

Alesina and Giavazzi, 15-31 and 43-64

Tony Judt, “Ill Fares the Land,” *The New York Review of Books*, April 29, 2010 (R)

The Economist, “Northern Lights,” “The Secret of Their Success,” and “The Ins and the Outs,” February 2, 2013 (R)

September 27-29: Social Movements

Crepaz and Steiner, 162-177

MIDTERM!

October 4-6: Communism

V. I. Lenin, "What Is to Be Done?" in Mitchell Cohen and Nicole Fermon, eds., *Princeton Readings in Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 530-534 (R)

Nicolas Berdyaev, *The Origin of Russian Communism* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966), 114-148 (R)

Berend, 3-38 and 155-221

QUIZ 3!

October 11: The Collapse of Communism

Berend, 222-253

Katherine Verdery, "What Was Socialism and Why Did It Fall?" in Nikki R. Keddie, *Debating Revolutions* (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 221-243 (R)

Timur Kuran, "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the Eastern European Revolutions of 1989," in O'Neil and Rogowski, 349-366 (R)

October 13: FALL BREAK!

October 18-20: Post-Communism

Jacek Lubecki, "Echoes of Latifundism? Electoral Constituencies of Successor Parties in Post-Communist Countries," *East European Politics and Societies* 18, 1 (February 2004), 10-44 (R)

Dorothee Bohle and Bela Greskovits, "Neoliberalism, Embedded Neoliberalism and Neocorporatism: Towards Transnational Capitalism in Central-Eastern Europe," *West European Politics* 30, 3 (May 2007), 443-466 (R)

Matthew Brunwasser, "That Crush at Kosovo's Business Door? The Return of U.S. Heroes," *The New York Times*, December 11, 2012 (R)

QUIZ 4!

October 25-27: European Integration

Alasdair Blair, *The European Union since 1945*, 2nd edition (Harlow: Pearson, 2010), 114-130 (R)

Crepaz and Steiner, 304-331

Alesina and Giavazzi, 119-134

Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj, "The French Referendum: The Not So Simple Act of Saying Nay," *Political Science and Politics* 39, 2 (April 2006), 261-268 (R)

November 1-3: The Euro

Alesina and Giavazzi, 143-164

Martin Feldstein, "The Failure of the Euro," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2012 (R)

Fred C. Bergsten, "Why the Euro Will Survive," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2012 (R)

The New York Times, "Greece to Receive Another Chunk of Bailout Aid," June 17, 2016 (R)

Film: Michael Tuft, *The Love of Money* (2009)

PAPER DUE!

November 8-10: Enlargement

Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova, "National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement," *East European Politics and Societies* 17, 1 (February 2003), 42-57 (R)

The Economist, "In the Nick of Time," "The Dark Side of Globalization," and "Largesse While It Lasts," May 29, 2008 (R)

BBC, "EU Enlargement: The Next Seven," September 2, 2014 (R)

The Economist, "Beyond the Fringe," June 11, 2016 (R)

QUIZ 5!

November 15-17: Immigration

The Economist, “For Those in Peril” and “Stop the Boats,” April 25, 2015 (R)

Matteo Garavoglia, “Securing Europe’s Borders,” *Foreign Affairs*, April 29, 2016 (R)

Eduardo Porter, “For Immigrants, America Is Still More Welcoming Than Europe,” *The New York Times*, December 5, 2015 (R)

Film: Karsten Kjaer, *Bloody Cartoons: Freedom of Expression and the Clash of Cultures* (2008)

FILM REVIEW 2 DUE!

November 22: Euroskepticism

Peter Hall, “The Roots of Brexit,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2016 (R)

The New York Times, “How Britain Voted in the E.U. Referendum,” “Overwhelmed by Brexit? Here are the Basics,” and “Making Sense of ‘Brexit’ in 4 Charts,” June 24, 2016 (R)

The Economist, “Shifting Sands,” “Fragmentation Nation,” and “Sifting through the Wreckage,” July 2, 2016 (R)

November 24: THANKSGIVING BREAK!

November 29: Europe and the World

Crepaz and Steiner, 331-350

Bruce Stoke, Richard Wike, and Jacob Poushter, “Europeans Face the World Divided,” Pew Research Center, June 13, 2016 (R)

Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Germany’s New Global Role,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2016 (R)

FINAL EXAM ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 7, 3:00-5:30PM!

IN-CLASS READING ASSIGNMENT

Please read the attached article, “Anti-Americanism Down in Europe, but a Values Gap Persists,” and think about the following questions:

1. How did President Obama’s election change the way America is seen in Europe? What differences remain in European and American attitudes toward military force?
2. Are Americans more or less religious than Europeans? Did these results surprise you? Why or why not? In your opinion, does morality require belief in God?
3. More Europeans than Americans believe that success in life depends on forces beyond our control and that the government should help the poor. What might explain this?

December 4, 2012

Anti-Americanism Down in Europe, but a Values Gap Persists

By Richard Wike, Associate Director, Pew Global Attitudes Project

Europeans generally reacted to President Obama's re-election with a mixture of excitement and relief, just as they did four years ago. For many across the Atlantic, Obama's 2008 victory signaled the end of the Bush-era estrangement between the U.S. and its Western allies, and the emergence of an America that would see the world a lot like Europeans do. However, despite Obama's re-election at home and continued popularity in Europe, his presidency has not closed the long-running transatlantic values gap. Instead, on issues such as the use of military force, religion, and individualism, Americans and Europeans continue to disagree.

Obama has been popular in Europe since he toured the Continent as a presidential contender. Following George W. Bush's two terms in office, Europeans immediately embraced Obama's presidency. A stunning 93% of Germans expressed confidence in Obama in the early months of his first term, compared with just 14% for Bush during his final year in office. In Britain, France, and Spain, the new American president also received stratospheric ratings.

The result was a dramatic "Obama effect" on attitudes toward the U.S. In France, for instance, America's favorability rating soared from 42% in 2008 to 75% in 2009. And importantly, support for American policies grew, especially support for U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. The enthusiasm that greeted Obama's election has waned a bit over time, even in Europe, but vestiges of "Obamania" remain. The [2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey](#) found at least eight-in-ten expressing confidence in the U.S. president in Germany, France, and Britain.

However, while the pervasive anti-Americanism of the Bush years has receded, the "values gap" between Americans and Europeans is alive and well. Polls consistently find a transatlantic divide when it comes to fundamental beliefs on a variety of political and cultural issues. Americans and Europeans view each other with less hostility today, but they still don't see the world in the same way.

Take the issue of military force. Americans remain more inclined than Europeans to say it's necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world. Meanwhile, they are significantly less likely than Europeans to believe that getting UN approval is necessary before using military force to deal with international threats. America's willingness to "go it alone" in world affairs has become an ingrained piece of the country's international image – and it hasn't changed much in the Obama years. Majorities across Europe continue to see the U.S. as acting unilaterally, not taking into account the interests of other nations when making foreign policy.

The Obama administration's use of drone strikes illustrates the divide over hard power. About six-in-ten Americans – including majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and independents – approve of U.S. drone attacks against extremist leaders and organizations in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. But in seven of the eight EU nations surveyed by Pew in 2012, more than half oppose these strikes, including nine-in-ten Greeks and 76% in Spain. The lone exception is the British, who are almost

evenly divided on this issue.

Religion is another topic where Americans and Europeans hold very different views. In largely secular Western European nations such as Spain, Germany, Britain, and France, less than a quarter consider religion very important to their lives. Even in Poland, where Catholicism still plays an important role in public life, only 27% say religion is very important. By contrast, fully half of Americans hold this view. Similarly, solid majorities in the six EU nations surveyed by Pew in 2011 said you do not have to believe in God to be a moral person, but only 46% of Americans felt this way.

The same 2011 poll asked Christians from the U.S. and eight European nations whether they identify first with their nationality or their religion. Americans were evenly split: 46% said they think of themselves first as Americans and 46% as Christians. In seven of the eight European countries, a majority of Christians identified primarily with their nationality. Only 8% of French Christians, for example, said they thought of themselves first as Christians.

Individualism also continues to differentiate Americans and Europeans. Most Americans believe individuals largely control their own fate – just 36% agree with the statement “Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control.” However, half or more in Germany, France, and Spain agree with this statement. Europeans also believe in a very different relationship between the individual and the state. When asked which is more important, that everyone be free to pursue life’s goals without interference from the state, or that the state play an active role in society to guarantee that no one is in need, 58% of Americans choose the former. Majorities across Western and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, say making sure no one is in need should be a bigger priority.

Of course, even on fundamental values like these, opinions can and do shift over time, and on a few key issues, the values gap is shrinking. For instance, Americans are not as convinced as they used to be about their own cultural superiority – in 2002, six-in-ten agreed with the statement “our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior.” By 2011, just 49% held this view, much closer to the levels typically registered in Europe. Public opinion on homosexuality has also shifted dramatically. The percentage of Americans saying society should accept homosexuality rose from 49% in 2007 to 60% just four years later. This is still much lower than the high levels of acceptance witnessed in Europe – more than eight-in-ten in Spain, Germany, France, and Britain believe homosexuality should be accepted – but the gap is clearly closing. The recent passage of marriage equality ballot initiatives in four U.S. states highlights how quickly public opinion on this issue is changing.

Moreover, young Americans increasingly look like their cohorts across the Atlantic on these questions. Nearly seven-in-ten Americans under age 30 say homosexuality should be accepted and only 37% think their culture is superior to others. Young people are also much more likely than older Americans to believe the government should make sure no one is in need. If these trends continue and expand to other topics, the transatlantic values gap could someday vanish. But for the foreseeable future, the divide will likely persist, regardless of who occupies the White House.